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There  have  been  many  attempts,  theoretical  and  empirical,  to  explain  the  persistence  of  a 
favorite-longshot bias in various horse betting markets. Most recently, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) 
have shown that the data for the US markets support a misperceptions of probability approach in line 
with prospect theory over a neoclassical approach of the Quandt (1986) type. However, their paper 
suffers from two basic difficulties which beset much of this literature. First, the theoretical model used 
fails to allow for the existence of horse betting markets which either display no such bias (or a reverse 
bias) as in Hong Kong and at least one large Australian market (Busche and Hall, 1988, Schnytzer, 
Shilony and Thorne, 2003 and Luppi and Schnytzer, 2008). Second, econometric testing and theoretical 
modeling are facilitated by the highly unrealistic assumption that the betting population is homogeneous 
with respect to either information or attitude to risk or (usually) both. Our purpose is to show that 
allowing  for  heterogeneous  betting  populations  (in  terms  of  both  attitude  to  risk  and  access  to 
information) permits the explanation for the different biases (or their absence) observed in different 
markets within a strictly neoclassical framework of rational bettors. We conclude with empirical support 
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1   Introduction 
What causes the favorite-longshot (hereafter f/l) bias? This is a question which has fascinated 
and  frustrated  economists  and  psychologists  since  Griffith  first  published  a  paper  demonstrating  its 
existence at the Churchill Downs track in 1949
2. The puzzle deepened when Busche and Hall (1988) 
demonstrated the existence of a reverse f/l bias at the track in Hong Kong and Busche (1994) showed that 
the Japanese horse betting market also displayed a reverse  f/l bias
3. Subsequently, Schnytzer and Luppi 
(2008) showed that not only is there no longer any bias at the close of betting in Hong Kong but that 
there isn’t even a bias at different times prior to the close of betting. Finally, there is a large betting 
market in Australia where a bias appears at the opening of betting and is steadily eliminated as the betting 
proceeds. What is more, the same population of bettors does not eliminate the bias when betting in a 
different market, the only difference between the two markets being access to information (Schnytzer, 
Shilony and Thorne, 2003). In sum, there are pari-mutuel (tote) horse betting markets with an f/l bias (the 
vast majority), and there are small numbers with a reverse bias or with no bias at all.  
The purpose of this paper is to present a unified model whereby rational bettors with differing 
attitudes to risk and different access to information may give rise to any of these outcomes in betting 
markets. In order to capture exclusively demand side influences on the betting markets, we restrict out 
attention  to  tote  markets  only,  although  fixed-odds  markets  may  be  operating  in  the  same  given 
environment.
4 Thus, our major concern is to check whether, in contrast with psychological models of 
bettor  behavior,  we  are  able  explain  the  wide  range  of  observed  outcomes  based  solely  upon 
considerations  of  attitude  towards  risk  and  access  to  information,  without  needing  to  invoke 
psychological biases on the kind to be found in papers in behavioral economics. An excellent, very recent 
example of such studies is that of Snowberg and Wolfers (2010), who show that the d ata for the US 
markets  support  a  misperceptions  of  probability  approach  in  line  with  prospect  theory
5  over  a 
neoclassical approach of our kind  or of  the Quandt (1986) type. Our problem with the Snowberg and 
Wolfers approach is that, in order to explain a reverse f/l bias (which is not in evidence in their data, but 
known to be or have been in evidence elsewhere) they would need to argue, at least a priori, that bettors 
in, say, the Japanese market are afflicted by a misperception of probabilities problem o pposite to that of 
American bettors, whereas Australian bettors in a market with no bias suffer from no such afflictions 
whatsoever! The conceptual confusion implied by such an approach requires no further elaboration.  
The real difficulty is that economet ric testing and theoretical modeling are facilitated by the 
highly unrealistic assumption that the betting population at a given track (which is the source of the data) 
is homogeneous with respect to either information or attitude to risk or (usually) both . Indeed it is 
difficult to imagine how one might proceed otherwise in the absence of further data sets.  Accordingly, 
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when we have built our theoretical model, we draw on empirical evidence from different source for 
support. This evidence is provided in Section 4. 
Our conceptual approach considers first bets and then bettors. To bet on a horse to win a race is 
to purchase a binary gamble (a specific kind of contingent commodity) which returns the tote payout for 
$1 bet if the horse wins and returns nothing if it loses. We develop a measure of the inherent riskiness of 
such a bet for each horse in the race. Inherent riskiness is the riskiness of a gamble defined independently 
of either the utility or the wealth of the individual contemplating taking the gamble. In other words, the 
index is unconcerned with the attitude of the individual towards risk, but attempts to capture that risk 
which is inherent to the gamble itself. The first such index was presented by Aumann and Serrano (2007) 
(hereafter [AS]), but it is restricted to gambles which risk-averse agents would accept. Thus, while it is an 
index of inherent risk, it is restricted in its applicability to a particular type of agent and does not even 
cater to a risk-averse investor who wishes to sprinkle his portfolio with some potentially high return, high 
risk  gambles.  For  [AS],  risk  aversion  applies  to  every  component  of  a  portfolio  and  is  not  an  "on 
average" notion. For our purposes, given that many if not most horse bettors are generally viewed as risk 
lovers, the index must be expanded to account for all possible kinds of gamblers. This expansion, in 
general terms, appears in Schnytzer and Westreich (2009) (hereafter [SW]). 
The [AS] index has one feature which should be true of any index of risk and yet  is surprisingly 
hard to find among other measure of risk. It turns out to be critical for our analysis of the f/l bias. It is 
what [AS] term the Duality Axiom: As they put it, "Duality says that if the more risk-averse of two 
agents accepts the riskier of two gambles, then a fortiori the less risk-averse agent accepts the less risky 
gamble." We present the relevant features of the [SW] extended index as developed for our current 
purposes in Section 2. We show there that if the less risk loving agent accepts the riskier of two gambles 
then a fortiori the more risk loving agent accepts the more risky gamble.   
 
As we shall see, the over- and under-betting of favorites and longshots turns on the nature of the 
bets of different inherent riskiness available to bettors and the attitudes to risk and available information 
which leads bettors to rationally engage in biased betting behavior. 
Which brings us to bettors, whose behavior in interaction with the riskiness of bets is discussed 
in Section 3. The bettors may either accept, in principle, gambles with perceived negative and positive 
returns (risk lovers), or accept only perceived positive return gambles (risk averse bettors). There is also 
the group of risk neutral bettors but, for ease of exposition and without loss of generality, we group these 
with the risk averse bettors and do not deal with them explicitly in Section 3.
6 Now, in contrast to the 
simplifying assumptions of Quandt (1986), (hereafter [Q]),  we do not assume that all risk lovers will 
back all horses. It will be shown that if a bet on a horse is of sufficiently high inherent riskiness,  there 
will be even risk lovers whose utility functions reflect insufficient risk “lovingness” to encourage them to 
bet on that horse. For a parallel reason, not every risk averse bettor will necessarily back every horse 
offering a positive expectation. 
With  respect  to  information  access,  we  make  the  simple  assumption  that  all  bettors  range 
between complete knowledge of all horses’ objective winning probabilities and complete ignorance as 
reflected by the assignment of equal winning probabilities to all horses participating in any given race. 
This assumption leads immediately to the well-known observation that a regular f/l bias, as observed in 
most horse betting markets, follows, ceteris paribus, if bettors are unaware if the horses’ true winning 
probabilities.
7 They need only bet in accordance with their subjective winning probabilities. Note further, 
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that an increase in transaction costs (the track take) simply increases the extent of the bias.
8 No recourse 
to either prospect theory or any other form of irr ationality is required. Hence, if there is to be either a 
reverse bias or no bias in a betting market, it must be the case that some bettors, at least, have full 
information vis a vis the winning probabilities of all horses in the race.  We further show that some 
bettors must be risk averse in such markets. Finally we investigate the impact of transaction costs on the 
f/l bias. Some conclusions are provided in Section 5. 
 
2  The Inherent Riskiness of Horse Bets  
In this section, following [AS] and [SW], we present those features of a generalized index of 
inherent riskiness necessary for our analysis of the f/l bias. Given that horse bettors make have a wide 
range of attitudes towards risk, we make no a priori assumptions about such attitudes.  
A utility function is a strictly monotonic twice continuously differentiable function  u defined 
over the entire line. We normalize u so that:  
  (0)=0 and (0)=1. uu   
   
 If u is concave then an agent with a utility function u is risk averse, while if u is convex, then an agent 
with a utility function u is risk lover. 
 
Definition 2.1  An agent is said to have Constant Absolute Risk (CAR) utility function if his normalized 



















 If  0 >   then the agent is risk-averse with a CARA utility function, while if  0 <   then the 
agent is risk-loving with a CARL - Constant Absolute Risk-Loving - utility function. If  0 =   then the 
agent is risk neutral.  
 
The next theorem appears in [SW] extending the original idea of [AS]. It verifies the existence of 
the general index for the following class of gambles. A gamble g is gameable if it results in possible 
losses and possible gains. If g has a continuous distribution function, then it is gameable if it is bounded 
from above and below, that is, its distribution function is truncated.     
 




   
 Then for any wealth, a person with utility function   u  is indifferent between taking and not taking  . g  In 
other words, the CAR utility function   u  satisfies for all  , x   
  ). ( = ) ( x u x g Eu     
Moreover,  is positive (negative) if and only if Eg is positive (resp. negative).   
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Definition 2.3  Given a gamble  , g  denote the number   obtained in Th.2.2  by the upper limit of taking 
. g   
 
        The notation upper limit is justified by the following:  
 
Theorem 2.4 Let   be the upper limit of taking a gamble  . g  Then: 
1. If  0 > Eg  then all CARL accept  g  and a CARA person with a utility function   u  accepts  g  if and 
only if  
    < < 0  
 2. If  0 < Eg  then all CARA reject  g  and a CARL person with a utility function   u  accepts  g  if and 
only if  
  0 < <   
3. If  0 = ) (g E  the all CARA people reject  g  while all CARL people accept  . g  
 
Given a gamble g and its upper limit α define its index Q(g) by  
  ( ) = Q g e
 
  (1) 
     
   Th. 2.4 and the fact that Q is a monotonic decreasing function of α, imply that: 
 
Corollary 2.5 An increase in riskiness corresponds to a decrease in the set of constant risk-attitude agents 
that will accept the gamble.  
 
Caution: The corollary above does not say that constant risk-attitude agents prefer less risky gambles. It 
says that they are more likely to accept them.  
 
    It is straightforward to check the following properties: 
  
Corollary 2.6  The generalized index  ) (g Q  given in (6) satisfies: 
2.  0 > ) (g Q  for all  . g  
2. If  0 > Eg  then  1 < ) (g Q  and if  0 < Eg  then  1. > ) (g Q  When  0 = Eg  then  1. = ) (g Q  
3.  . ) ( = ) (
1/N g Q Ng Q  In particular  
 
1 ) ( = ) (




Remark 2.7 Unlike the case of the [AS]- index, homogeneity of degree 1 does not hold. However, when 
0 > ) (g E  then it is replaced by (increasing) monotonicity. This follows since in this case  1. < ) (g Q  
Hence if  1 < t  then  ), ( < )) ( ( = ) (
1/ g Q q Q tg Q
t  while if  1 > t  then  ). ( > )) ( (
1/ g Q q Q
t   
If  0 < ) (g E  then  ( ) 1 Qg   and Q is monotonically decreasing with respect to multiplication by t. This 
follows by the same argument as above, with the reverse inequalities.  
 
An  intuitive  explanation  for  higher  and  lower  values  of  riskiness  for  negative  expectation   6 
gambles  could  be  as  follows.  Following  Cor.  2.6,  consider  the  suggested  index  of  riskiness  as  the 
opposite of the number of constant risk attitude gamblers who will accept it. Now, gamblers who put 
money on gambles with negative expectations are all risk lovers, which means that they get thrills from 
higher values of money, and by their utility functions, they make better use of larger gain.  Such a 
gambler gets more thrills when doubling his bet, that is, he enjoys the gamble and the possible outcomes 
more, and so it is more attractive for him to take it. As a result, more risk-lovers will take the double 




         The results derived thus far are true for all gameable gambles, but since a win bet on a horse is a 
binary gamble, we now proceed to derive some necessary results for such simple gambles.  In what 
follows we prove that for binary gambles the generalized index is a monotonic function of Var(g), which 
is increasing for gambles with Eg>0 and decreasing otherwise.  
 
         Let g be a gamble that results in a gain of M with probability  p  and a loss of  L  with probability 
. 1 = p q    We  assume  M   and  L   are  positive  real  numbers.    The  following  lemmas  are  a  natural 
observation; we prove it here for completeness. Note that: 
 
22 ( ) ( ) (1 )( ) (2) Eg p M L L g p p M L         
 
 
Lemma 2.10 Given two binary gambles that result in loss of L and have the same expectation, then a risk 
lover agent will always prefer the gamble with the greater variance, while a risk aversive gambler will 
prefer the smaller variance. 
 
Proof:  Define a function F by F(p)=Eu(g). Set E=Eg, then by (2) 
  ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ). (3)
EL
F p p u L pu M p u L pu L
p

          
Hence   
 
()
'( ) ( ) '( ) ( ).
E L E L E L
F p u L u L u L
p p p
   
       
         The first two terms give the value obtained by substituting -L in the tangent equation to the function 





 .  If u is a concave function, then this value is necessarily smaller then u(-L)  and 
thus F'(p) < 0. If u is convex then F'(p)>0. 
 
 Since by (2), 
2 ( ) ( ) (1 )/ V g E L p p    , we have 
2
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0.
( ) ( )
V g E L Eu g Eu g p Eu g
p p V g p V g p
      
     
    
 
 
 The desired result follows now by both parts. 
 
Lemma 2.11 Let g be a gamble that results in a loss L and a gain M. If Eg ≥ 0 then all risk lovers accept   7 
it. If Eg ≤ 0 then no risk averse gambler will accept it. 






Substituting in (3) we obtain that when Eg=0 then Eu(g) 
satisfies: 
( ) ( ) ( ).
M M L
F u L u M




Now, if u(x) is concave then the above value is less than u(0) = 0; that is, it is negative. By Lemma 2.10, 






 and risk averse agents will not accept it. The 
reverse argument works for a convex utility function, u(x). 
 
Theorem 2.12  Let  g  be a gamble that results in a gain M  with probability  p  and a loss L otherwise. 
Consider Q(g ) as a function of the independent variables L, M and Eg. Then we have: 


























Proof.  Assume  12 . MM   Let  1 g  be the gamble resulting in  1 M and  2 g  resulting in  2. M  Let 
() ug  be a CAR utility function as in Definition 2.1. Assume 1   satisfies  0. = ) ( 1 1 g Eu  By Th.2.4, if 
0 < Eg  then  0 < 1   which imply that 
1() ug   is concave. Since  12 MM  it follows that p1 > p2, and 
by Lemma 2.10 we have  12 11 0 ( ) ( ). Eu g Eu g    Hence an agent with utility function 
1 u  accepts 
. 2 g  This implies by Th.2.4 that  , < 2 1    where  0 < 2   is the upper limit of taking  . 2 g  Since Q=e
-α  
we have  12 ( ) ( ) Q g Q g   and we are done. When  0 > Eg  then  1 0,   and by Lemma 2.10, 
12 11 0 ( ) ( ). Eu g Eu g  
 
Hence  1   rejects  2 g  and thus  21 <   and  12 ( ) ( ). Q g Q g   If  0 = Eg then 
Q(g) = 1 and the result follows.       QED 
 
As a corollary we obtain: 
 
Corollary 2.13  If Eg is fixed, then an increase in riskiness corresponds to a decrease in the set of agents 
that will accept the gamble.  
 









, hence by Lemma 2.10 less risk averse gamblers accept it. If Eg < 0 then by   8 








, hence by Lemma 2.10 less 
risk lovers accept it. 
 
For binary gambles, fixing Eg and increasing M, means increasing V(g). Thus Theorem 2.11 implies that 





















  3  A Model of Betting Behavior    
   
Horse race betting is a complex example of a binary bet.  Payouts are more-or-less known, when 
the betting is via pari-mutuel, but the probabilities of different race outcomes must be estimated. Assume 
that  in  a  given  race  we  have  n  horses  h  with  prospective  probabilities  of  winning  given  by  h p .     
Assume further that at a certain moment an amount  h b  is bet on a horse h.  We define the subjective 













         Following [Q], if the racetrack retains a fraction t of all money bet for taxes, expenses, and profit 
then the payoff per dollar invested on horse h is given by:   
1





     
 
 
The mean (expectation) and variance of the outcomes are given by: 




(1 ) (1 )( ) (3)
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h h h h
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    
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     
 
         
        We suggest here the following model. Our assumptions are that: 
  Some of the bettors know the true probabilities of winning and some know them only with 
certain errors;  
  the bettors may be either risk lovers or risk averse. Thus their utility functions may be either 
concave or convex; 
  bettors are rational in the sense that they want to maximize their expected utility functions; and    9 
   even risk lovers are subject to risk constraint. They do not accept gambles that are too risky (in 
the sense that the expected return according to their utility functions is negative).   
 
We discuss first the effect of errors in information on true probabilities of winning.  
 
Claim 1: A lack of information about the true probabilities of winning implies that the prospective 
winning probabilities are estimated with an f/l bias. 
 
Proof of claim 1:   Assume the true probabilities are given by the set {qh} and there is an error in the 
estimation of these values.  We assume that the error distributes equally among the horses and it is 
weighted by some coefficient α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Thus, α = 0 means no error, while α = 1 means no prior 
information on the horses. Since we have n horses in the race, no information means that the winning 
probabilities of each horse are estimated as 1/n. If a bettor has an error of weight α, then he estimates the 
winning probabilities of a horse h by: 
1
(1 ) , 0 1. hh pq
n
         
   Now, if the true probabilities satisfy q1 ≤  q2… ≤ qn, where at least one strict inequality holds, 
then necessarily q1 < 1/n and qn > 1/n. In this case  11 pq  and  . nn pq  Thus the winning 
probabilities are estimated with an f/l bias. 
 
 
  Based on this result, we present four different groups of gamblers: 
  A – Risk-lovers who do not know the exact objective winning probabilities. 
  B – Risk-averse gamblers who do not know the exact objective winning probabilities.  A 
representative of this type is one who is ready to spend a certain amount of money for 
entertainment. For this bettor, a bet on horse h is a gamble that results in either 0 or Oh+1=(1-
t)/bh . 
  C – Risk lovers who know the exact objective probabilities. This group may contain addicted 
gamblers and its behavior is described in [Q]. 
  D - Risk-averse gamblers who know the exact objective probabilities. A representative of this 
type is an insider that (on the average) makes a profit from the track. 
  
  Our hypothesis is that groups A and B represent the majority of bettors at the opening and early 
on in most, though not necessarily all, betting markets, while groups C and D join in towards the end. To 
test this we discuss below how each type contributes to the bias.  
 
Group A: By Claim 1, they use a set of probabilities {ph}, which they believe is the set of true 
probabilities. This set is either biased or equal to the set of true probabilities {qh}. 
 
If  ph = bh for all h, then by (3)  
h  =-t   and    
2
h  =(1-t)
2(1-bh)/bh     for all h.  
  Since all bets have the same expectation, and since bettors of group A are risk lovers, they 
maximize their utility functions when they bet on the horse with maximal variance. By the formula 
above, maximal variance is obtained for the horse with the smallest bh, hence those bettors will increase   10 
the amount of money bet on the horse h with the lower bh, and so they will push the odds towards 
equality, that is bh =1/n for all h. As was shown previously, any weight given to bh =1/n is necessarily f/l 
biased. 
 
  If the prospective probabilities are different from bh then we are in the situation described in 
[Q]’s model. As is proved there, in this situation we necessarily have a f/l bias with respect to the set 
{ph}, which is already biased. As a result, they may increase the f/l bias. 
 
    Yet, we have some minor restrictions to [Q]. He claims that the market cannot reach an 
equilibrium if ph = bh for all h.  We wish to indicate that betting on the smallest bh may yield a gamble 
which is too risky even for risk lovers. This may happen for two independent reasons. The first reason 
could be if the utility functions of the risk lovers are not steeply concave, that is, if they are close to risk 
neutral. Another possible reason is if the track tax t is higher. In this case both Eg and its variance are 
smaller, which imply that less risk lovers accept it. 
 
  For both reasons, unlike in [Q], we may have an equilibrium even with ph = bh . But by Claim 1, 
the set {ph} is already f/l biased, hence we conclude: 
 
  Group A will contribute to the f/l bias. The bias increases if there is a lake of information. It 
is smaller if the track tax t is higher.   
 
          
Group B:  If ph = bh for all h, then again all betting have the same expectation. Risk aversive agents 
maximize their utility functions when choosing the minimal odds, that is, the maximal bh. In this case, we 
have a reverse bias. Once a horse h is overpricing, they will not bet on it and thus reduce again bh. As a 
result, as a group they cannot reach equilibrium.  On the other hand, recall their prospective probabilities 
are already biased depending on the error in estimation. We conclude: 
 
  Group B can generate any result, even a reverse bias. 
 
Group C:  Members of group C act according to the true winning probabilities. Here we can adopt [Q]’s 
model with one restriction mentioned above – they do not bet if the betting it too risky. As a result, the 
market can be stable also if ph = bh.  To sum up: 
  
  Group C contributes to f/l bias providing they are large enough risk lovers and the tax is 
not too high. Their contribution is smaller than that of group A since they do not have the error 
effect. 
 
Group D:  Members of group D are not risk lovers, hence they bet on a horse h only if its expected return 










  it follows that they will bet on a horse h only if 
(1 ). hh b p t   However, they may avoid the betting if it is too risky. This would happen if ph is close 
to bh or if t is high.   As a result, when there is a big gap in mispricing the horse h, they will bet and 
reduce the gap. If t is high, or if there is only little mispricing, they will not act. So members of group D 
reduce big gaps between subjective and true probabilities. In particular they also reduce any kind of bias.   11 
They never generate bias. To sum up: 
 
  Group D reduces mispricing. Its members do not act when there is no mispricing. They will 
bet less if t is higher. 
 
4  The F/l Bias: Empirical Evidence 
 
          We have shown that, on the basis of remarkably simple assumptions vis a vis attitude to 
risk and access to information, it is possible to explain how regular, reverse and no f/l bias may arise as a 
result  of  rational  bettor  behavior.  In  particular,  since  the  average  return  to  betting  with  the  tote  is 
negative, it is reasonable to assume that most bettors at most tracks will be risk lovers and that, further, at 
most tracks, many of these bettors will not be fully informed as to horses winning probabilities. It is thus 
not surprising that most studies have found that horse betting markets are beset by a f/l bias. And yet 
anomalies have been found, although our model permits us to explain them.  
In this section we provide further details on two of the more unexpected outcomes in betting 
markets  and  discuss them  in  terms  of  our  model. The first,  based  on results  derived  by  Luppi  and 
Schnytzer (2008), deals with the Hong Kong horse betting market where, in recent years, there has been 
no  statistically  significant  bias  of  any  kind  either  at  the  start  or  the  end  of  betting.  The  following 
regressions are run on a data set of 4258 Hong Kong races in which 54,335 horses took part between the 
3rd of September 2000 and the 18th of October 2006. The test for a favourite-longshot bias is conducted 
for the probability equivalents of the prospective tote odds overnight, 5 minutes before the race and at the 
close of betting. As Tables I and II indicate, there is no favourite-longshot at any reasonable levels of 
statistical significance at any stage of the betting. Further, the information contained in the three sets of 
odds is different at each stage of the betting. This is evident in Table III, which shows the result of a 
linear probability model explaining winning probabilities as a function of the odds at the tree stages of 
betting. All three sets of odds are statistically significant at far better than the 1% level of significance, 
which shows that information relevant to explaining the horses’ real winning probabilities is changing as 
the betting proceeds and that while bettors may have errors in their probability estimates, these errors are 
fairly evenly distributed. It may be noted in passing that, if we examine the coefficients and standard 
errors  in  the  tables  more  carefully  than  is  really  necessary,  bettors’  estimates  of  horses’  winning 
probabilities become more accurate as betting proceeds. 
In  terms  of  our  model,  the  implications  are  that  many  bettors  in  Hong  Kong  -  as  already 
suggested by Busche and Hall (1988) - must be risk averse and, further, that if there is inside or expert 
information that is not available to many bettors, it must be spread over horses more or less equally on 
average and not concentrated on favourites or longshots and that the extent of such information is not 
large. Some evidence in this direction is provided by the fact that most horses in Hong Kong train at 
either of the two tracks (owing to the cost of land in Hong Kong, which would make private training 
tracks prohibitively costly) and thus their training behaviour is readily observable by interested observers. 
Finally,  the  Hong  Kong  Jockey  Club  (which  controls  horse  racing)  web  page 
(http://www.hkjc.com/home/english/index.asp) provides more information than is available elsewhere in 
the world where horses race. Thus, for example, videos of the three previous starts of all horses entered in 
the coming race may be viewed from various camera angles with expert commentary available in a 













The presence of Favourite-longshot Bias and different types of bettors 
 
 
Variables  Overnight bettors 
Betting 5 minutes 
before race start   
 
Betting at the close 
 
         Prob_00  1.024971***   
          (.0187403)     
   
         Prob_05 
 
    .9968372***    
(.0127564)  
 
         Prob_fo 
   
    1.000875*** 
(.0122404)    





   (.0013326)  
Observation   20   20   20  
   Adjusted R
2 (%)    33.99   33.93   33.99  
Table II: Dependent variable: Win, a dummy which receives 1 for the winning horse in the race and zero otherwise. 
Standard  errors  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  as  required  by  the  linear  probability  model  are  reported  in 
parenthesis.  










In  order  to  test  the  presence  of  favourite-longshot  bias,  we  perform  an  F-  test  on  the  joint 
hypothesis: 
 
fo i i prob , 05 , 00 1 _    
Constant = 0 
 
 
Table II   13 
F-test results for the presence of Favourite -longshot Bias 
 
 
Variables  Overnight bettors 
Betting 5 minutes 
before race start  
 









(0.9817)                      
 
       
 
Table III 
The role of different information sets 
 
 
Explanatory Variables   
Odds open  -.0030464*** 
(.0002629) 
Odds_05  .0020522*** 
(.0003918) 
Odds final  -.0047497*** 
(.0003488) 
Observations  54,335 
Adjusted R
2 (%)  9..3  
 
Table  III:  Dependent  variable:  Win,  a  dummy  which  receives  1  for  the  winning  horse  in  the  race  and  zero 
otherwise. In addition to the explanatory variables shown in the table, the regression also contains horse-jockey 
interactions. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity as required by the linear probability model are reported 




The second example provides a direct measure of the impact of access to information on a 
particular betting population. It is based upon the results obtained by Schnytzer, Shilony and Thorne 
(2003).  The  data  set  (3430  harness  races  with  33233  horses  starting  from  June  1997  to  the  end  of 
February  1998  in  Australia  at  tracks  covered  by  the  Victorian  tote  operator,  TABCORP)  covers  a 
population of Victorian bettors who may bet on races run both inside and outside Victoria. The difference 
between these two race types is that the pool on betting on the races outside Victoria contains money bet 
by the Victorians only and thus represents an exclusively off-course population. On the other hand, when 
bettors bet on Victorian races, their money is pooled with on-course tote bettors in Victoria. This means   14 
that, in this case, inside information contained in plunges with on-course Victorian bookmakers reaches 
the pool via the tote bets of on-course bettors (see Schnytzer and Shilony (1995)). In other words, the 
bettors betting on Victorian races receive more information updates as the betting proceeds than those 
betting on interstate races. Victorian bookmakers also bet on races being run outside Victoria but they 
generally rely on odds ruling at the interstate track and this information arrives in Victoria in sporadic 
bundles only and generally not in the last few minutes of betting. 
Assuming that the mix of Victorian tote bettors as regards attitude to risk is unlikely to be 
affected by which race the bettor is betting on, differences in the extent of and change in the f/l bias 
between these betting sub-populations may be attributed to the difference in their access to information.  
Table IV shows the results of a regression described by Schnytzer, Shilony and Thorne (2003): 
The horses were sorted by the closing payouts and the sample then divided into 30 groups of as 
nearly as possible equal size.  In addition to the payouts at the close of betting, data were available 
in viable quantities for the projected payouts 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 15 minutes before the actual 
start of the race, and 30 minutes before the official start time of the race.  The latter case was 
chosen to obtain a set of payouts reflecting bettor behaviour before bookmakers had begun to 
offer fixed odds on-course.  These data were also sorted according to the closing payouts.  Thus 
the payouts for these time periods in each group reflect changing bettor evaluation of the same 
horses over time.  The same procedure was adopted for races being run in Victoria as for those 
being run outside the state. 
...Table [IV] shows the regression results consolidated as one regression for each market, with 
dummy [and interaction] variables for the intercepts and slopes of the different time periods.  
These  results  indicate  the  more  discrete  nature  of  the  interstate  market,  with  all  variables 
significant except the dummies for 1 minute before the close.  The latter lends support to the 
hypothesis that, in this market, any important late changes in the bookmakers’ market interstate 
are not transmitted.  On the other hand, in the Victorian market, there is a smooth, significant 
change in the regression line until around the 5 minute mark, at which point the market has 
appeared to reach something very close to its final equilibrium.  The fact that the regression 
constant is generally greater in the interstate market may indicate that Victorian bettors are, on 
average, less knowledgeable about interstate markets than their own.  This would lead to more 
uninformed betting, a known cause of a favourite-longshot bias.
9  Indeed, although the bias is not 
removed in this market, it appears that the presence of bookmakers, as conveyors of information, 
is more important in this market than the domestic market. 
 
It is clear that the elimination of a bias at least five minutes before the end of betting on Victorian 
races  has  been  facilitated  by  the  information  provided  to  tote  bettors  via  betting  with  Victorian 
bookmakers. It seems also reasonable to argue that the reduction in the extent of the bias in both markets 
is due to the entry of informed risk averse bettors into the market subsequent  to the opening of the 
bookmakers market. Indeed, it may be the case that the persistence of a  f/l bias in markets outside 






                                        
9   See Thaler and Ziemba (1988). 
10 The case of the UK is complicated by the presence of both on- and off-course bookmakers, adiscussion of which 




Regression of Mean Win Frequency against Mean Subjective Probability 
Variable  Coefficient in Victoria  t-statistic  P>t  Coefficient in Other 
Markets 
t-statistic  P>t 
Slope  1.019355  32.164  0.000  1.107853  41.001  0.000 
Slope_1  .0245735  0.542  0.589  .0650679  1.654  0.099 
Slope_2  .0427793  0.934  0.351  .117948  2.928  0.004 
Slope_3  .0604486  1.308  0.192  .1649855  4.011  0.000 
Slope_5  .0785061  1.683  0.094  .2534352  5.922  0.000 
Slope_7  .0939413  1.997  0.047  .312916  7.121  0.000 
Slope_9  .1007083  2.133  0.034  .3560262  7.947  0.000 
Slope_10  .1018986  2.156  0.032  .3796904  8.386  0.000 
Slope_15  .1093001  2.301  0.022  .4467271  9.581  0.000 
Slope_30  .3021055  5.791  0.000  .8822636  15.739  0.000 
Constant  -.0020021  -0.411  0.681  -.0111775  -2.708  0.007 
Dummy_1  -.0025288  -0.365  0.715  -.0066958  -1.132  0.259 
Dummy_2  -.0044023  -0.633  0.527  -.0121376  -2.029  0.043 
Dummy_3  -.0062212  -0.890  0.374  -.016978  -2.809  0.005 
Dummy_5  -.0080795  -1.151  0.251  -.02608  -4.230  0.000 
Dummy_7  -.0096684  -1.372  0.171  -.0322008  -5.152  0.000 
Dummy_9  -.0103649  -1.468  0.143  -.0366371  -5.802  0.000 
Dummy_10  -.0104871  -1.485  0.139  -.0390722  -6.153  0.000 
Dummy_15  -.0112486  -1.589  0.113  -.0459706  -7.124  0.000 
Dummy_30  -.0311057  -4.193  0.000  -.0907896  -12.604  0.000 
Adjusted R
2  0.9717      0.9825     
No. of obs.  300      300     
 
Table IV: Dummy_x is a dummy variable for the regression constant x minutes before the actual start of the race (except x = 30, which is 30 minutes before the 





5  Conclusions   
In this paper we have presented a simple model which explains the presence of either an f/l, a reverse f/l bias or 
no bias at all in different horse betting markets. We have shown that different attitudes to risk combined with different 
access to information may explain all observed outcomes as being the result of rational behavior. In particular, the greater 
the risk lovingness and the greater the ignorance of the betting population, the greater the extent of an f/l bias. If the 
betting population is largely risk averse but to some extent uninformed a reverse bias may be observed. A risk averse, 
fully informed betting population will display no bias. By information we refer to the extent to which the winning 
probabilities  of  horses  in  the  race  are  known.  Finally,  since  the  measurement  of  a  bias  is  a  statistical,  and  not 
deterministic, issue it is not necessary that all bettors be of a similar kind for a given outcome to be observed. In a tote 
market, the outcome will be determined by the type of betting population which bets the relatively greater amounts; in 
most horse betting markets the weight of money would appear to be risk loving and/or uninformed while Hong Kong 
bettors appear to be, by and large, risk averse and knowledgeable. 
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